Catholic University Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 4 Summer 2016

Article 10

9-19-2016

Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common
Interest in the D.C. Circuit
Jared S. Sunshine

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Other Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in the D.C. Circuit,
65 Cath. U. L. Rev. 833 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss4/10

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in the D.C.
Circuit
Cover Page Footnote
J.D., cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Columbia College of Columbia University in
the City of New York, 2004. The views expressed in this Article are the author’s alone, and do not
represent those of the abovesaid entities or any other.

This essay is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss4/10

SEEKING COMMON SENSE FOR THE COMMON
LAW OF COMMON INTEREST IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
Jared S. Sunshine+
“Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the common law, as
interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear
explanation of what a common interest is.”1
The attorney-client privilege is the most ancient and revered of the
evidentiary protections cognizable at common law.2 At base, it provides that
communications between attorney and client are undiscoverable so long as
their purpose is legal and the exchange remains confidential.3 Its nouveau
riche kinsman, the work product privilege,4 may be later to the scene, but has
rapidly established itself as a central aegis of the American adversarial
system.5 Rather than focusing on communications with counsel, it shields any
documents prepared in preparation for litigation.6 Yet both are often frustrated
+
J.D., cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Columbia College of
Columbia University in the City of New York, 2004. The views expressed in this Article are the
author’s alone, and do not represent those of the abovesaid entities or any other.
1. Miller v. Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
2. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law.”); 1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 1:1-2 (2d ed. 1999). See generally Geoffrey Hazard, An
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (1981); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should
Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 866–67 (1998) (observing that clients can waive the attorneyclient privilege by “voluntarily disclosing a communication to third parties, [or] failing to take
reasonable precautions to preserve the confidentiality [of information].”).
4. Although many sources use the terminology “protection” rather than “privilege” in
regard to work product, this Article adopts the latter in view of the usual outcome that material
protected under the work product doctrine is in fact privileged from discovery. See generally
Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 917,
923 (1982). See also, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (referring
to both attorney-client and work product as privileges); cf. infra note 34 and accompanying text
(discussing terminology in regard of other evidentiary privileges).
5. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow
Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1050 (D. Del. 1985) (“When compared to the seasoned
existence of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine stands as a virtual newcomer
to federal jurisprudence.”).
6. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397–98; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–40 (1975);
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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by the modern complexity of legal actions.7 Where once the attorney served as
confidante to a single client, contemporary corporate counsel regularly find
themselves advising sprawling multipartite enterprises working in tandem with
others to achieve their goals.8 As the Supreme Court has explained, given “the
vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern
corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to
find out how to obey the law’ . . . particularly since compliance with the law in
this area is hardly an instinctive matter.”9
Adapting venerable common law to such changing times has not proven
easy. In particular, the attorney-client privilege has long been said to require
strict confidentiality, lest its protections be waived.10 Commentators have
often noted that waiver may be a misnomer, since clients normally do not
willingly forgo the privilege, but rather forfeit it involuntarily or inadvertently
through actions inconsistent with secrecy.11 Any sort of third party—even
advisors relevant to rendering legal advice—endangers the inviolability of the
protected conversation.12 The risk is almost greater for the fact that forfeiture

7. See Rice, supra note 3, at 863–65; Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege:
Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 77–78 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 863–65.
9. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bryson B. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Corporate Arena, 24 BUS. LAW 901, 913 (1969)); see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig.,
235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn.
1976).
10. Rice, supra note 3, at 853–57 (“In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege,
whether employed in state or federal courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the
other in confidence, and subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained.”); see Hunt
v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“But the privilege is that of the client alone, and no rule
prohibits the latter from divulging his own secrets; and if the client has voluntarily waived the
privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the mouth of the attorney.”); United States v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of
such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”).
11. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 390 (5th ed. 2007); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture.
Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”)); United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d 509, 520
(7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an oversight; a waiver is a deliberate decision”). But cf.
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 788 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled
October 18, 1979 (Appeal of Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980)) (“No matter what
standard of waiver [of privilege] is applied, the waiver must be knowing.”).
12. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“One of the
circumstances by which it is commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential is the
presence of a third person”); e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del.
1982) (“The presence of nonessential third parties not needed for the transmittal of the
information will negate the privilege.”).
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can be unpredictable.13 Such severe strictures hearken back to the origins of
the privilege with barristers as tradesmen-cum-gentlemen, leading to the
corollary that the attorney-client privilege was a sort of trade secret attendant
to their gentlemanly calling.14 Behavior inconsistent with secrecy negated the
privilege,15 and such a privilege was by definition confined to the litigation on
which the barrister was instructed.16
As time passed, however, these traditional contours of privilege law
increasingly fell short of serving their desired objectives.17 Attorney-client
privilege expanded from barristers engaged in a case at bar to encompass any
legal matter.18 Indeed, the very purpose of the privilege was reconceived as
not an adjunct to the gentleman esquire, but a right vested in the client to
confide in his chosen counselor.19 From a public policy perspective, the

13. Compare, e.g., In re G-I Holdings, 218 F.R.D. 428, 434–35 (D.N.J. 2003) (accountant
present to explain client’s proposed tax structure to counsel negated privilege), and Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (privilege negated in
communications with public relations firm), with FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147–48
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (privilege upheld in communications with public relations firm), United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1963) (privilege upheld through intermediary), and Miller
v. Haulmark Transp. Sys., 104 F.R.D. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (privilege also upheld through
intermediary).
14. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487 (1928) (“Since some lawyers were gentlemen almost virtute
officii, the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in them
constituted, as Dean Wigmore has shown, the original basis of the protection accorded to
communications between barrister and those who instructed him.”); Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070
(observing that “some of the early cases express the idea that the privilege was that of the lawyer
(a gentlemen does not give away matters confided to him)”); id. at 1071 (explaining that “at one
time the privilege was thought to belong to the lawyer rather than the client [because] [a] barrister
was considered not merely an ‘officer’ of the court but a member of it, who could no more
properly be asked to reveal a client’s confidences than a modern judge could be asked to disclose
matters heard in camera”).
15. See, e.g., Blackburn, 128 U.S. at 470.
16. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487; see also Hazard, supra note 2, at 1090–91 (“As one
can see, ‘tradition,’ both English and American, thus clearly sustained a privilege confined to
those communications that are related directly to pending or anticipated litigation.”).
17. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487–91; compare Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070–73, with
id. at 1075–85.
18. See generally Hazard, supra note 2, at 1073–85; see also WIGMORE, supra note 12,
§§ 2294–95 at 558–62, 565; Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061
(N.Y. 1991) (stating “the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation”).
19. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070 (“as the rule developed the privilege became that of
the client to have his secrets protected”); RICE, supra note 2, § 1:3 at 8–9. By contrast, the work
product privilege is held jointly by both attorney and client, and can be asserted by either. See In
re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Accordingly, the work product privilege was
adequately asserted below by both the Lawyer and the appellant.”); see also In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 812 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that the “work product privilege belongs to the
lawyer as well as the client”).
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privilege now sought to encourage clients to consult early and often with
learned counsel, both to avoid litigation ab initio, and to preserve counsel’s
ability to elicit the full facts necessary to discharge their professional
responsibilities without compromising their clients.20 Nonetheless, the
primeval necessity of strictest secrecy has persisted,21 notwithstanding cogent
arguments from respected scholars that it should be relaxed in light of modern
circumstances.22
This Article explores the contours of confidentiality amongst multiple
parties, specifically with reference to communications between competitors
and combining companies, and the D.C. Circuit whose precedent is so
important in such antitrust matters. Part I sets forth the related joint defense
and common interest doctrines that define privilege where more than one client
is involved, seeking to slice through the lack of clarity about their parameters
to identify how they overlap and differ. In particular, this Part focuses on the
so-called litigation requirement, which would problematically deny privilege to
multiple parties that are not actively confronting a lawsuit. Part II examines
precedent on these issues in the D.C. Circuit, identifying how certain
misconceptions have flourished and how they might be resolved. Finally, Part
III looks to the rationales behind the best reconciliation of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals’ precedent with many of its sister circuits and public policy
considerations.
As with many issues at law, the commentariat is sharply split as to the
proper metes and bounds of privilege.23 Some have forcefully argued that
common interest privilege is an incoherent or ill-conceived excrescence of
traditionally narrow privilege law.24 Others have defended common interest as
20. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 407 (1998); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 398 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976);
Radin, supra note 14, at 490; see also United States v. BDO Seidelman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816
(7th Cir. 2007) (finding advance consultation with attorneys “serves the public interest by
advancing compliance with the law”); Spectrum, 581 N.E.2d at 1061 (“Legal advice is often
sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid litigation”).
21. See RICE, supra note 2, at 853–57.
22. See generally id. at 888–91, 893–98 (hypothesizing what a more relaxed approach to the
attorney-client privilege would be like if the requirement of confidentiality was lost and what it
would mean for attorney-client communications).
23. See generally Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege
Should Not Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 475
(2012) (proposing limitations on the attorney-client privilege, including removing the privilege in
the “allied lawyer setting”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Symposium on Criminal Discovery, The
Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the
Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH.
U. L. Q. 19 (1990) (questioning the practice of applying the attorney-client privilege to nontestifying expert witnesses).
24. See Geisel, supra note 23, at 475, 480–87. Extending attorney-client privilege in
common interest situations has been criticized for “not encourag[ing] frank attorney-client
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supported by the same rationale as the underlying privilege, with little cost to
the search for truth.25 And well-heeled scholars have more generally decried
the strictures of confidentiality and called for a still-broader conception of
privilege.26 Looking to the Supreme Court’s holdings, this author would tend
to side more with a broader privilege, recognizing its invaluable role in the
development of the modern legal profession and representation.27 Nonetheless,
clarification of the common interest doctrine, notably in the D.C. Circuit, is
imperative to ensure that parties may depend on the application of whatever
view ultimately prevails.28
I. THE COMMON LAW OF COMMON INTEREST
Nowhere is secrecy more problematic than where companies collaborate
towards a common legal end, as happens frequently in an age of global
interdependency.29 If they seek to retain common counsel in a lawsuit, or their
respective counsel cooperate on issues of mutual importance, they might once
have been thought to forfeit their privilege.30 The judicial response was the
development of two closely related doctrines generally known as joint defense
(or, on the other side of the aisle, joint prosecution) and common interest.31
Under these analyses, materials disclosed between parties allied in a lawsuit or
sharing a common legal interest remain privileged from discovery,
notwithstanding the presence of a nominal third party.32 These doctrines are
not freestanding privileges, but exceptions or exemptions preventing forfeiture
of the underlying attorney-client or work product privilege.33 Nonetheless, it
communications that can improve legal representation, which is the heart of the privilege’s
purpose.” Id. at 482. In addition, “[o]ther proposed justifying rationales—such as increased
efficiency of representation, increased efficiency of the judicial system, or increased effectiveness
of representation—cannot survive cost-benefit analysis.” Id.
25. See generally Schaffzin, supra note 7; see also James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client
Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 634 (1997).
26. See generally Rice, supra note 3, at 856–60; cf. Douglas R. Richmond, The Case
Against Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Immunity, 30 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 253 (2006) (illustrating some of the difficulties that arise from strict
confidentiality requirements, including those arising from selective waivers of confidentiality).
27. Rice, supra note 3, at 856–60.
28. See generally supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
29. See Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., Inc., No. 970325, 2000 WL 33171004,
at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2000); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 77–78 (discussing and quoting
at length).
30. See supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
32. See id. § 76 cmt. c.
33. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (common interest
or joint defense allows parties “to exchange privileged communications and attorney work
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will be expedient to refer to them as evidentiary privileges rather than mere
doctrines, as the result of their application is that otherwise discoverable
documents remain privileged.34 The vast majority of the states,35 and every
circuit court of appeals,36 have adopted some form of the joint defense or
common interest privilege.
A. The Menagerie: Co-Clients, Joint Defense, and Common Interest
An initial question is whether joint defense and common interest are distinct,
or only different names for the same doctrine. Further complicating matters,
there is a third animal in this terminological menagerie, co-client privilege.37
The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers draws a line between
this distinct co-client privilege, where multiple clients are represented by the
same attorney; and common interest, where clients are represented by separate
counsel as to a shared issue.38 The Restatement then unhelpfully, if candidly,
points out that “[t]erms such as ‘joint defense’—less frequently, ‘common
defense’—are sometimes applied to” common interest.39 In fairness, Justice
Antonin Scalia rightly observed that the rules propounded in modern
Restatements are often “aspirational” rather than descriptive of judicial

product in order to adequately prepare a defense without waiving either privilege”); United States
v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Waller v. Financial Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d
579, 583 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).
34. E.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20,
28 (1st Cir. 1989) (defining “joint defense privilege”); Waller, 828 F.2d at 583 n.7 (same); In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (same);
Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437 (N.Y. 1992) (defining “‘common interest’ privilege”);
United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (defining joint
defense and common interest privilege). But see also Oxy Res. Cal. LLC v. Sup. Ct. of Solano
Cty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 634–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The ‘joint defense privilege’ and the
‘common interest privilege’ have not been recognized by statute in California. For this reason,
we will refer to the joint defense or common interest doctrine, rather than the joint defense or
common interest privilege, to avoid suggesting that communications between parties with
common interests are protected from disclosure by virtue of a privilege separate from the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other statutorily recognized
evidentiary privilege.”) (citations omitted). By way of comparison, see supra note 4 (discussing
terminology anent work product).
35. See Greg A. Drumright & W. Rick Griffin, Chapter 3: The Joint Defense Doctrine—
Cohesion Among Traditional Adversaries in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE
COUNSEL 35, 42–43 (Defense Research Institute 2008) (chart showing adoption by state); see
also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7.
36. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 41 (chart showing adoption by circuit); see
also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7.
37. See infra note 38 and accompying text.
38. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (co-client privilege), with id. § 76 (common interest privilege).
39. See id. § 76 (reporters note).
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consensus.40
Still, many authorities have echoed the Restatement’s
fundamental division based on singular or multiple counsel.41
The Restatement is quite correct, in any event, that courts and commentators
alike have conflated joint defense and common interest doctrines at times.42
Some expressly make no distinction at all, implicitly finding the difference to
be mere nomenclature.43 Others, getting closer to the reality, describe the
earlier development of joint defense theory and its eventual development into
modern common interest doctrine.44 Many fail to clearly distinguish co-client
representations at all, viewing them simply as joint defense or common interest
arrangements with shared rather than separate counsel45—despite nighunanimous admonitions by commentators against conflating co-client with
joint defense or common interest relationships.46 At least a few courts,
40. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 1045, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I write
separately to note that modern Restatements . . . are of questionable value, and must be used with
caution . . . . And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement
provision describes rather than revises current law.”); see also Jeffrey P. Schomig, The Abililty of
Trade Associations to Receive Advice on Antitrust and Other Legal Risks: Are These
Communications Protected from Discovery?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: ANTITRUST & TRADE,
Vol. 4, No. 6 (2011) (noting that the Restatement of Law is “a guide that carries no independent
authority”).
41. See generally, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 521–23, 533–34.
42. See Jason M. Rosenthal, Joint Defense Agreements and the Common Interest Privilege
in A YOUNG LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DEFENSE PRACTICE 147, 148 (2008) (“The courts frequently
use the terms ‘joint defense privilege’ and ‘common defense (or common interest) privilege’
interchangeably.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 275 (“Federal courts have use the term ‘joint
defense privilege’ to refer to both the joint client privilege and the ‘common interest’ privilege.”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The joint
defense privilege [is] also known as the common interest rule[.]”); United States v. Schwimmer,
892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (opining the “joint defense privilege” should be called the
“common interest rule”); Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (“While the doctrine is
occasionally referred to by courts and legal scholars as the joint defense privilege or the joint
defense doctrine, the more appropriate name . . . is the common interest doctrine.”).
44. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248
(4th Cir. 1990). See also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 61–63.
45. In re Teleglobe Comm’n Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[M]uch of the
caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege (which is the same as the ‘common-interest
privilege’ . . .) with the co-client privilege.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Michael Pavento, Daniel
H. Marti, Tracie Siddiqui & Patrick Eagan, Applicability of the Common Interest Doctrine for
Preservation of Attorney-Client Privileged Materials Disclosed During Intellectual Property Due
Diligence Investigations in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 353, 353 (2009)
(describing joint litigant privilege as a subset of common interest in which the clients are
“represented by the same attorney or different attorneys”).
46. See e.g., Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 37 (“The terms joint defense doctrine
and joint defense privilege should not be confused with the term ‘joint client doctrine.’ The joint
client doctrine protects confidential communications between co-parties and their common, as
opposed to separate, counsel.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 75 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Co-client representations must also be distinguished from
situations in which a lawyer represents a single client, but another person with allied interests
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however, have managed to penetrate the doctrinal disarray to clearly identify
the three basic species of multi-party privilege: “joint client” (i.e., what the
Restatement calls co-client), “joint litigant” (i.e., what most courts call joint
defense or joint prosecution privilege), and “common interest.”47 For the sake
of consistency and of adhering to the most frequently used terms, this Article
will follow the Restatement in denominating these three species: co-client,
joint defense, and common interest privilege.48
The threesome are best seen as various overlapping stages in the protracted
evolution of multi-party privilege. Codefendants have long had the right to
coordinate a common front and defense by retaining joint counsel, without
chancing that their strategizing be disclosed.49 Such co-client representations
were regular occurrences in the early United States, and although they had
their origin in criminal prosecutions,50 there has never been any bar to clients
jointly seeking a lawyer’s advice on a civil matter,51 or in matters unconnected
to litigation at all.52 Corporate persons may avail themselves of co-client
arrangements no less than natural persons.53 However, the approach and

cooperates with the client and the client’s lawyer (see § 76).”); see also Giesel, supra note 23, at
478–80 (advocating for distinguishing joint defense and common interest from co-client
postures); Fischer, supra note 25, at 634–35 (advocating for distinguishing between the often
“mangled” use of co-client and co-litigant concepts).
47. E.g., Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 347–48 (N.D. Ohio 1999); see
Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 148 (discussing Libbey Glass); see also Fischer, supra note 25, at
634–35 (distinguishing the three species).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000). Despite its use in the foundational common interest decision Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., this Article rejects the major competitor to the “common interest”
terminology, “community of interest,” as adding prolixity but not clarity. 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1159 (D.S.C. 1974). The two are tantamount at law, however. See In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at
363 n.18 (“[T]he community-of-interest privilege . . . is the same as the ‘common-interest
privilege[.]’”).
49. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 522–23 (“[H]istorically the attorney-client privilege has
protected communications in joint client settings. Early cases in the United States do not treat this
application of the privilege as controversial. Rather, it is treated as an accepted and indisputable
point of law—an inherent side-effect of clients being clients as a group.”).
50. See id.; see also, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge:
A New Approach to Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1481 (2002)
(indicating that early joint-defense agreements were often in criminal matters).
51. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 512 n.176; see also Eureka Inv. Corp., N.V. v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
52. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (in which coclients were involved in corporate divestiture); see also In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 121 B.R.
794, 796 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same).
53. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:23; see also e.g., Mirant, 326 B.R. at 648 (in which parent
and subsidiary corporation were co-clients); Santa Fe, 121 B.R. at 796 (same).
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positions taken by the co-clients must be strictly the same;54 a single lawyer
could not ethically pursue divergent tactics simultaneously for each of multiple
co-clients.55 This requirement follows naturally from the very definition of coclient arrangements: singular counsel representing plural clients.56
The more generalized joint defense doctrine, allowing for separate counsel,
arose in criminal suits against natural persons only in the nineteenth century.57
Like the co-client setting, joint defense has since been applied to companies
targeted by criminal and civil cases with regularity under the same rationale.58
54. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 195 (“When the same attorney simultaneously
represents two or more clients on the same matter, the individuals being represented are
considered joint clients.”); e.g., FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
joint client exception presupposes that communications have been ‘made in the course of the
attorney’s joint representation of a “common interest” of the two parties.’ The term ‘common
interest’ typically entails an identical (or nearly identical) legal interest as opposed to a merely
similar interest.” (citations omitted)); Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 854–55
(7th Cir. 1974); Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998)
(“The court concludes from these factors that the MacKays also shared the same common legal
interest as H & B and Jack MacKay. Accordingly, the court rules the MacKays had a joint
attorney-client relationship with Mr. Jacobson.”); see also Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323,
1988 WL 13746, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1988) (finding that the shared privilege only extends to
the specific subject matter of the joint representation, not other matters). But see sources cited
infra note 84 (cataloguing authorities holding that very similar interests can suffice).
55. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 198 (“Such joint representation is permissible from the
attorney’s perspective as long as it does not create a conflict of interest that will require a division
of the attorney’s loyalties.”); Giesel, supra note 23, at 481, 519–22; e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653
F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that when co-clients’ interests “‘diverge and
become antagonistic, their lawyer must be absolutely impartial between them, which usually
means that he may represent none of them.’ To hold otherwise would undermine the loyalty and
trust upon which the attorney-client relationship is based.”) (quoting HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 112 (1953)); see also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 396–97 (S.D. Tex.
1969); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the
corporate counsel in a derivative securities suit must be different from that for the company and
directors). But see, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding the parties were co-clients even whilst the shared lawyer secretly
colluded with one co-client against the other on a different matter, notwithstanding the patent
ethical issues); infra note 90 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461.
57. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841–42 (Va. 1871); Patricia
Welles, Comment, Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
321, 324–25 (1981) (“Since Chahoon v. The Commonwealth in 1871, United States courts have
recognized the attorney-client privilege in a joint defense. The general rule for joint defense
situations can be stated simply. If individually retained attorneys for codefendants communicate
in the furtherance of a joint defense, that communication is privileged.”); see also Giesel, supra
note 23, at 504–08, 531, 536; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 58–59.
58. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 287 (“The concept of a joint or common defense has
long since been extended to the civil context.”); RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 254 nn.22–23 (“The
protection is available in both criminal and civil contexts.”); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 59–60
(“In the 1942 case Schmitt v. Emery, the Supreme Court of Minnesota became the first court to
extend this joint defense privilege beyond the criminal context into the civil arena[.]”); Giesel,
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By its nature, joint defense focuses on the alignment of the parties for a
specific litigation, whether overtly threatened or pending.59 This can be seen
vividly in the emergence of the mirror-image, joint prosecution privilege to
protect communications and work product exchanged by coplaintiffs.60 The
privilege extends to any statements in furtherance of defense strategy and
positioning, even if the individual approach actually taken differs between
defendants to the point of adversity.61 Although some loosely labeled “joint
defense” arrangements involve co-clients represented by the same counsel,62
joint defense as a distinct privilege implies separate counsel acting in concert.63
This distinction is crucial:64 unlike the co-client posture, there is no ethical or
practical bar to separate counsel coordinating strategy but ultimately making
different choices that are best for their respective clients.65 As the Fourth
Circuit summed up:
supra note 23, at 531 (“First applied in Chahoon v. Commonwealth as a privilege applicable only
in allied lawyer settings involving criminal matters in reference to a joint defense, courts now
apply the privilege in both criminal and civil settings.” (citations omitted)); see also W. Fuels
Ass’n, Inc. v. Burlington N.R. Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984).
59. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (The privilege “affords protection to
confidential communications among jointly aligned co-parties and their separate counsel . . . .”);
Welles, supra note 57, at 324–25; see also, Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th
Cir. 1965) (in which the husband and wife were both prosecuted for income tax infractions).
60. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 63–65; Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38; In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249–50 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680, 685–86 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(citing Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249); Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243, 247
(C.D. Cal. 1993); Sedlacek v. Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D.
Cal. 1992).
61. See Welles, supra note 57, at 328–30 (citing cases for the “reality of joint defense—
namely, that defendants’ interests often coincide only on certain issues”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the
Supreme Court Standard 503, lawyer-client privilege); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–
88 (3d Cir. 1985) (“We agree with the district court’s ruling that the correspondence was
privileged, since it is best viewed as part of an ongoing and joint effort to set up a common
defense strategy between a defendant and an attorney who was responsible for coordinating a
common defense position. Communications to an attorney to establish a common defense
strategy are privileged even though the attorney represents another client with some adverse
interests.”) (citing United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979)); Hunydee,
355 F.2d at 184–85 (describing criminal codefendants contemplating whether each should testify
against the other); see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1964).
62. See, e.g., Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(describing the “‘joint-defense privilege,’ where two or more co-defendants are frequently
represented by a single attorney”); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 353.
63. See, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184–85; Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249.
64. See sources cited supra notes 45–46; see also, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184 (in which
separate counsel was obtained “[b]ecause of a possible conflict of interest” between husband and
wife).
65. See JEROME G. SNIDER, HOWARD A. ELLINS & MICHAEL S. FLYNN, CORPORATE
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 4.06 (2006) (“In the joint defense context, each
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Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly
interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the
litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for
the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a
common interest in litigation should be able to communicate with
their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively
prosecute or defend their claims.66
What then is common interest? By comparison to the previous two privileges,
the common interest doctrine reaches further, protecting materials
communicated amongst cooperating parties and their separate counsel on any
matter in which they share a common legal interest.67 Such an interest would
not necessarily depend upon alignment in adversarial proceedings (as in joint
defense),68 nor upon the retention of common counsel (as for co-clients).69

individual party has his or her own attorney and attorney-client relationship, there may be clear
conflicts of interest among the parties, and communications among the parties may be guarded.
In the multiple client context, there is only one lawyer for all the parties, the parties have either no
conflicts of interest or have agreed to take the risks involved in such a situation, and generally
speak freely when communicating with the common lawyer.”); see also In re Teleglobe
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In particular, because co-clients agree to
share all information related to the matter of common interest with each other and to employ the
same attorney, their legal interests must be identical (or nearly so) in order that an attorney can
represent them all with the candor, vigor, and loyalty that our ethics require . . . . In the
community-of-interest context, on the other hand, because the clients have separate attorneys,
courts can afford to relax the degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying
that their attorneys’ ability to represent them zealously and single-mindedly will suffer.” (internal
citations omitted)).
66. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th
Cir. 1990).
67. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 290 (“Unlike the joint defense privilege, the common
interest does not require or imply that an actual suit is or ever will be pending. It does require,
however, that a definable common interest exist.”); RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 244–45 (“The
‘community of interest’ rule is distinguished from the ‘joint defense’ rule by the fact that the
collaboration between the parties need not be related to a pending legal action.”); Fischer, supra
note 25, at 632–34.
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000); RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 244–45; EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 275 (“For instance,
one can have a common interest which will allow the sharing of privileged communications
without waiver without having a ‘joint defense’ to any pending or prospective litigation at all,
either actual at the time that the privilege is shared or prospective.”); id. at 290; Pampered Chef v.
Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“The privilege does not require that the
interest be in litigation or that litigation be actual or imminent for communications to be
privileged. So, the fact that Ms. Salela is not a defendant in this case—which plaintiff suggests
scotches the common interest doctrine—does not matter.” (internal citations omitted)).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs
from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”); id. cmt. b
(“Clients thus can elect separate representation while maintaining the privilege in cooperating on
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Parties may wish to cooperate in literally innumerable legal situations outside
of litigation: for example, ensuring that mutually beneficial advertising is not
misleading,70 applying for patents,71 conducting due diligence,72 or avoiding
any liability in the first place to prevent a lawsuit.73 Courts have regularly
recognized that the common interest privilege serves the same purpose as the
underlying privilege: “the free flow of communication to enhance the quality
of legal advice.”74
The common interest privilege is the most evolved of these doctrines
discussed because it allows for separate counsel, like joint defense, whilst
looking beyond litigation to allow collaboration in any legal matter, as with coclient privilege.75 It is not a surprise that a Delaware court recently concluded,
perhaps a bit strongly, that “[a]lthough the common interest doctrine has its
origin in the joint defense privilege, it has completely replaced that privilege
for information sharing among clients with different attorneys.”76 There
remains a place for joint defense where parties to a case want to coordinate
strategies without necessarily proceeding in the lockstep demanded by a
common interest.77 In practice, however, common interest should apply to the
substantial majority of valid multi-party privilege postures.78
To be sure, some courts and state codes demand that, like joint defense,
common interest can arise only where litigation is impending or pending.79
common elements of interest”); see also Pampered Chef, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 965 n.5 (finding
retention of a single attorney unnecessary to common interest).
70. E.g., LG Elecs. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08 C 242, 2009 WL 3294800, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 24, 2009).
71. E.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
72. See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45.
73. E.g., United States v. BDO Seidelman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Applying the common interest doctrine to the full range of communications otherwise protected
by the attorney-client privilege encourages parties with a shared legal interest to seek legal
‘assistance in order to meet legal requirements and to plan their conduct’ . . . this planning serves
the public interest by advancing compliance with the law . . . .”); Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390–91;
see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“Corporations should
be encouraged to seek legal advice in planning their affairs to avoid litigation as well as in
pursuing it.”).
74. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 62 & n.41.
75. See id. at 57–62.
76. In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. Del. 2010).
77. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965).
78. See Fischer, supra note 25, at 652 (implying a broad application of the common interest
privilege, limited by the qualifiying principle that “information shared must be for the purpose of
furthering the legal interests of the members of the arrangement). Cf. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d
881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
79. E.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose . . .
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client . . . by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the
lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action
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Such an approach mirrors that of the model Uniform Rules of Evidence.80 A
litigation requirement would dramatically restrict the scope of the common
interest privilege, or at least incite parties to contrive attenuated post hoc
theories of having anticipated some litigation that eventually ensued.81 The
intertwining of the common interest privilege with litigation may have its roots
in the earlier joint defense privilege; similarly, some courts’ misconception that
common interest can apply only to co-clients confuses the modern privilege
with a predecessor.82 Surreptitiously importing inapposite requirements from
earlier privileges makes little sense and only serves to blur lines that should be
clear.
The better and more prevalent argument, both amongst commentators and in
the courts, is that parties should be permitted to privily consult counsel
together whenever they have an identity of interest.83 (Indeed, some courts
would allow very similar but not identical interests to suffice, despite the fact
that the parties may later be adverse.84) This approach has been adopted by
and concerning a matter of common interest therein . . . .”) (emphasis added); HAW. R. EVID.
503(b)(3); ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R.
EVID. 502(b)(3); TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp.,
272 F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001); see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74–75.
80. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE ACT 32-34 (amended 2005); see also Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at
41 (“Other states have adopted a statutory form of the joint defense doctrine based on Uniform
Rule of Evidence 502(b), which requires pending litigation for the doctrine to apply.”).
81. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 715–16.
82. See Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Schaffzin,
supra note 7, at 58–62; EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 276 (“The ‘common interest exception’ arose
in the criminal context where separate counsel for multiple defendants aligned possible defenses
or at least discussed their litigations strategy.”).
83. E.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974);
see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 634 (“This Article will examine the common interest
arrangement and whether preserving the confidentiality of information-sharing arrangements
should be restricted to matters in litigation. I believe that no valid reasons exist for such a
limitation as long as our legal system continues to recognize the underlying privilege itself.”);
Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 76–78 (explaining why “jurisdictions should uniformly reject the
limitation of the common interest doctrine to pending or anticipated litigation”); EPSTEIN, supra
note 11, at 275 (“There is no need for parties to be allied in a given litigation although it often is
the case that they are. What is essential is that their legal interests be fully aligned.”).
84. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re
Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (“The privilege applies where the
interests of the parties are not identical, and it applies even where the parties’ interests are adverse
in substantial respects. The privilege applies even where a lawsuit is foreseeable in the future
between the co-defendants.”); GUS Consulting GMBH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d
539, 541–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (“Although some federal courts have held that the doctrine
applies only where the nature of the parties’ common interest is ‘identical, not similar’. . . other
courts, ‘[i]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege . . . have not required a total
identity of interest among the participants. The privilege applies when a limited common purpose
necessitates disclosure to certain parties. Thus, even where a later lawsuit is foreseeable between
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statute in Delaware, the nation’s bellwether of corporate law.85 It has been
endorsed in the Third Restatement.86 And it has been recommended by the
Supreme Court.87 The Federal Rules of Evidence Manual recognizes its role in
upholding privilege’s basic purpose: “In many cases, it is necessary for clients
to pool information in order to obtain effective representation. So, to
encourage information pooling, the common interest rule treats all involved
attorneys and clients as a single attorney-client unit, at least insofar as a
common interest is pursued.”88 Free of a litigation requirement, parties may
properly maintain privilege on one discrete matter while pursuing divergent
strategies elsewhere.89 In extraordinary cases, privilege may apply even as
companies secretly and separately prepare claims against one another.90
This is not to say that the presence or absence of litigation has no bearing on
the question of common interest. Mutual business and commercial interests,
regardless of similarity, cannot suffice for the common interest privilege,91 just
the co-defendants[,] that does not prevent them from sharing confidential information for the
purpose of a common interest.’”) (citations omitted); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 70–71 (“Thus,
sharing parties may overcome even significant adversities between them if the interests for which
the parties shared the information are identical and they can demonstrate that they exchanged the
communications with the reasonable expectation that the communications would remain
confidential.”).
85. See DEL. UNIFORM R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW. INST.
2000) (“If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are
represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under sections 68–72 that
relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons.”). But see sources cited supra note 40
and accompanying text.
87. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51
F.R.D. 315, 361–62 (1971).
88. 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 599 (6th ed. 1994);
see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 51.
89. Leslie, 437 B.R. at 497; e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir.
1985); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 111–12 (D. Conn. 1997); 330
Acquisition Co. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 783 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
90. See, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“Eureka assuredly was concealing from CTI its consideration of legal action against
the latter . . . . Wigmore’s first principle presupposes that the communication at issue was made in
the course of the attorney’s joint representation of a ‘common interest’ of the two parties. Here,
although Fried, Frank was representing Eureka and CTI in a matter of common interest at the
time the communications at issue were made, those communications were not made in the course
of its representation on that matter; indeed, they were made in the course of representation
distinctly not in the interest of CTI.”).
91. E.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The development
of defenses to allegations against Aramony simply is not a legal matter concerning UWA.
Although these defenses could help preserve UWA’s reputation, the preservation of one’s
reputation is not a legal matter. If the allegations concerning Aramony could have subjected
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as they cannot suffice for the attorney-client or work product privileges.92 The
pendency of a lawsuit surely helps to segregate the legal from the lay.93
However, the ease of administration cannot abridge the privilege itself,94 and
there is far more to the legal profession than litigation.95 Indeed, some subjects
may present both business and legal questions, and the existence or overlap of
commercial concerns does not and should not foreclose privilege as to the legal
aspects.96 And from a normative perspective, the law should not dissuade

UWA to civil or criminal liability, Aramony’s claim would be stronger.”); John Doe Corp. v.
United States, 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); Rayman v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 654 (D. Neb. 1993); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146, 1167 (D.S.C. 1974); see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 72 (“Courts also require that the
common interest shared by the parties be a legal, rather than a purely commercial, interest.”); see
also Mineaba Co. v. Pabst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Bank Brussels Lambert v.
Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui &
Eagan, supra note 45, at 353–54 (considering the question of legal interest in due diligence).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. c (AM. LAW.
INST. 2000) (extending privilege to communication for the purpose of legal advice and “not
predominantly for another purpose.”); see, e.g., W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991) (“Attorney-client communications concerning business matters are not
within the attorney-client privilege.”).
93. See Tr. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc.,
266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“There is no clearer example of when the privilege is protected
than in this case, where the transferor and transferee are engaged in related litigation against a
common adversary on the same issue or issues.”); Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223
F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004) (looking to whether litigation was anticipated in assessing
whether asserted common interest was business or legal); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D.
508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“The timing and setting of the communications are important
indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest necessary to justify extending
the privilege to encompass intercorporate communications appears most clearly in cases of codefendants and impending litigations but is not necessarily limited to those situations.”); see also
Fischer, supra note 25, at 642; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing common interest in the
context of the litigation requirement).
94. Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“While it would probably be
more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner’s internal investigation by
simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner’s attorneys, such
considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client
privilege.”).
95. See SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 513 (“The [common interest] privilege need not be limited
to legal consultations between corporations in litigation situations, however.”).
96. E.g., In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 & n.9 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (“The fact
that there may be an overlap of a commercial and a legal interest for a third party does not negate
the effect of the legal interest in establishing a community of interest.”); accord Strougo v. BEA
Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v.
Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“While the lenders’ business interests may
coincide or overlap with their legal interests, the obligations they seek to enforce are grounded in
contract and, by definition, involve the pursuit of legal rights and remedies.”); Cheeves v. S.
Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 130 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1975). Contra, e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert, 160 F.R.D. at 447 (“[T]he
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clients—whether singular or multiple—from soliciting legal advice that
encourages adherence to rule of law and preserves judicial resources by
avoiding lawsuits entirely.97
The co-client, joint defense, and common interest privileges are thus best
seen as forming an incompletely overlapping Venn diagram.98 The following
table summarizes the best view of each of the doctrines hitherto discussed:
Table 1: Comparison of Multiple-Party Privileges
CO-CLIENT
NO. OF CLIENTS
SHARED COUNSEL?
LITIGATION
REQUIREMENT?
IDENTICAL INTEREST?99

JOINT DEFENSE

COMMON
INTEREST

multiple
shared

multiple
separate

multiple
separate

no

yes

no

yes

no

yes

As can be seen, the common interest relationship is a complement to coclient privilege, allowing clients to choose between mutual (co-client) and
separate (common interest) representation in any matter in which they have
identical interests.100 By contrast, joint defense is somewhat different, in that it
requires an underlying litigation against which to jointly defend, but allows
greater leeway in variance of tactics once that fundamental alignment of
interests is established.101 The community of interest in joint defense is
common interest doctrine does not encompass a joint business strategy which happens to include
as one of its elements a concern about litigation.”).
97. See United States v. BDO Seidelman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007).
98. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Leslie
Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010); see also supra Section I.A.
99. As mentioned above, some courts would find very similar but not identical interests
sufficient. See supra note 84. For the purposes of these distinctions, “identical” will be used to
encompass both standards.
100. See Fischer, supra note 25, at 638–39 (“The common interest arrangement represents
an interpretation of the attorney-client privilege that avoids forcing defendants to elect between
either common counsel, with the associated ‘conflicts of interests’ such representation presents,
or separate counsel, with its cost of forfeiting the confidentiality of the shared information.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2000)
(“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs from the coclient rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”).
101. See GUS Consulting GmbH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539, 541–42
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008) ( “[I]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege, [courts]
have not required a total identity of interest among the participants.”); accord In re Megan-Racine
Assocs., Inc., 189 B.R. 562, 572 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court
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circumscribed by the litigation; in common interest, it is bounded by the
identical stratagem pursued.102 The burdens imposed on the privilege’s
proponent also differ sharply.103 Co-clients are established based on traditional
principles of legal retention;104 codefendants might present a docket sheet as
predicate for joint defense;105 but putative parties in common interest must
show their strategies actually coincide.106 Though intimately related, each has
a place in the protection of both professional representation and the broader
adversarial system, the central concerns of the attorney-client, and work
product privileges respectively.107

Standard 503, lawyer-client privilege); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir.
1985) (citing United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979)); Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330
F.2d 347, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1964). As previously mentioned, one can speak imprecisely of a
“joint-defense” relationship in which clients share the same counsel, but the requirements of such
arrangements reduce to that of co-client, owing to the ethical and practical impossibility of
representing adverse clients. Compare supra text supported by note 62, with text supported by
note 63.
102. See generally supra Section I.A.
103. Cf. United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating in the common
interest context that “a party asserting a privilege exemption . . . bears the burden of
demonstrating its applicability.”) (quoting In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir.
2001)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 63 n.43 (“As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to apply the common interest doctrine.”).
104. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 528 (“In the joint client representation scenario, a
heightened requirement of common interest is not necessary. The common interest is inherent in
the nature of the representation. As long as the communication is in the context of the joint
representation and as long as it satisfies the other elements of the attorney-client privilege, then
the communication should enjoy the privilege.”); e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title
Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 936–37 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F.
Supp. 828, 830–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Compare Sky Valley Lts. P’ship v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd.,
150 F.R.D. 648, 652–53 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing eleven factors for determining co-client status)
with EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 281 (citing six factors).
105. See generally Stephen A. Messer and Scott J. Seagle, Combining Forces: A Primer on
the Joint Defense Agreement in Civil Litigation, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 7–8 (2011) (explaining
that courts have often afforded the joint defense privilege to codefendants by virtue of their
participation in a common defense); see also RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 260 & n.37 (“[S]ome
courts have assumed this intention [of furthering a joint defense] when the parties are
codefendants or prospective codefendants.”) (citing cases).
106. See FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Thus, the proponent of
the exception must establish cooperation in fact toward the achievement of a common
objective.”); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. Del. 2010); see also United
States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1993).
107. Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461.
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B. Privilege Amongst Competitors and Combinations
The antitrust and merger contexts present special challenges for corporate
common interest.108 Market rivals clearly cannot be allowed to conceal
anticompetitive collusion behind a fig leaf of putative common interest, which
would impermissibly co-opt the shield of privilege for violations of the law.109
Competitors who claim their interests coincide inherently raise a certain
quantum of suspicion.110 To use a recurring example, claims of mutual
privilege proponed by competing members conferring under the umbrella of a
trade association have yielded a diversity of holdings: some older decisions
favored viewing members as co-clients of the association’s lawyers, but more
modern courts typically reject that presumption as unwieldy and unwarranted,
and demand a specific showing that the competitors mutually sought legal
counsel in the matter under dispute.111 Whether this then places the various
members in a common interest privilege stance, or merely confirms their status
as co-agents or co-clients, remains largely unclear from the cases.112

108. See Anne King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures during
Negotiations for Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1412–13 (2007) (stating that
“most courts conclude that disclosures made during transaction negotiations work a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, and thus courts decline to allow common interest protection. But a few
courts hold that disclosures during negotiations for a substantial transaction may be protected
under the common interest doctrine. Hence, with respect to substantial transactions, courts are
split as to whether common interest protection applies to disclosures made during negotiations.”).
See generally Schomig, supra note 40.
109. See Gregory B. Mauldin, Invoking the Common Interest Privilege in Collaborative
Business Ventures, 56 FED. LAW 54, 58 (2009); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D.
383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (voicing concern over extending privilege to antitrust matters due to
the likelihood of abuse, and inadequate regulatory measures); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 277
(“The greatest push to expand the common interest privilege comes from corporate attorneys
representing multiple clients often in an antitrust context. It is precisely in such a context that the
potential for abuse is the greatest. The ‘common interest’ privilege may be nothing but a cover
for an antitrust conspiracy.”); cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword.”).
110. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976) (directing
proponent of privilege as to common interest in antitrust consultations with competitor to submit
affidavit of the content of the discussions to the court for in camera inspection, noting that the
“individual postures relevant to the antitrust discussions in point are undefined”). See supra note
109 and accompanying text.
111. Compare Schomig, supra note 40, at 10 (“Several older trial court opinions have, with
little analysis, held that all members of a trade association enjoy an attorney-client relationship
with the association’s legal counsel.”), with id. at 10–11 (“Some more recent court decisions have
analyzed the privilege status of attorney-client communications made between trade association
members and the association’s attorney in a manner that takes into account many factors
governing both the general nature of the attorney-member relationship and the circumstances
surrounding the particular communications at issue.”).
112. Schomig, supra note 40, at 10–11.
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Antitrust concerns were discussed at length in the Fifth Circuit’s decision to
deny common interest privilege to competitors in In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp,113
in which privilege was sought on a memorandum on labor law circulated
amongst several offshore drilling companies.114 In demurring, the court
expressed serious fears about according privilege to market rivals who might
well be engaging in price fixing or other antitrust violations.115 To be sure,
under the crime-fraud doctrine, no privilege could apply to exchanges
constituting antitrust (or any other) legal infractions.116 The panel majority’s
holding is troubling, however, insofar as it prescribes an especially severe
litigation requirement:
In the present case, Santa Fe admits in the motion for reconsideration
it filed in the district court that the communications it claims are
protected by the privilege were not made in anticipation of future
litigation. Instead, the documents were “circulated for the purpose of
ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws and minimizing any
potential risk associated with the exchange of wage and benefit
information.” In sharing the communications, therefore, they sought
to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation. They were not
preparing for future litigation.117
Given the opinion’s stated concerns, such reasoning seems perverse, penalizing
companies whose recourse to counsel was to avoid violation of antitrust laws.
Yet the majority was nonchalant as to any policy concerns stemming from
providing disincentives for companies to mutually ensure their behavior is
legal.118 It was left to the dissent to forcefully, if futilely, expound the better
113. 272 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 2001).
114. Id. at 709.
115. Id. at 714 (“[T]he record in this case is neither clear nor indisputable with respect to
Santa Fe’s motive for sending its inhouse counsel’s memorandum to its horizontal offshore
drilling competitors. It is possible that the disclosures were made to facilitate future price fixing
in violation of the antitrust laws, as the plaintiffs contend.”); see also id. at 711 (holding “there
must be a palpable threat of litigation at the time of the communication, rather than a mere
awareness that one’s questionable conduct might some day [sic] result in litigation, before
communications between one possible future co-defendant and another, such as the ones here
made between one horizontal competitor and another, could qualify for protection”).
116. See id. at 714 n.9 (“If so, they would fall outside the scope of any attorney-client
privilege as communications made for criminal or fraudulent purposes.”); Duplan Corp v.
Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1196–97 (D.S.C. 1974) (finding that a “prima facie
showing of an antitrust violation establishes the tort exception to the attorney-client privilege,
requiring production of all confidential communications that show the opinions of the associates’
attorneys”); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563–64 (1989) (providing an
explanation of the crime-fraud exception); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
117. Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 713.
118. Id. at 714 (“There is no justification within the reasonable bounds of the attorney-client
privilege for horizontal competitors to exchange legal information, which allegedly contains
confidences, in the absence of an actual, or imminent, or at least directly foreseeable, lawsuit. . . .
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holding: “the parties claiming protection under the rule only need share ‘a
common legal interest’ about a matter, and there need be no actual litigation in
progress.”119
In any event, the Fifth Circuit’s approach to common interest is distinctly
ungenerous compared to its sister circuits.120 Other courts have had little doubt
that competitors “shared a common legal interest regarding compliance with
antitrust and other laws.”121 Society’s interest in promoting lawful behavior is
paramount, and “manifestly does not require that there be actual or
contemplated litigation. Indeed, in response to the explosion of regulations
from federal and state agencies, business entities routinely seek the advice of
lawyers precisely so that they may avoid litigation by planning for the
future.”122 Such concerns are at their zenith in the antitrust setting, given that
attorneys are the primary actors ensuring corporate compliance.123 Without
competent counsel capable of consulting confidentially with their counterparts,
companies cannot be expected to discern the delicate bounds that define
antitrust law.124 And, vexingly, the continued “undifferentiated use” of the
terms “joint defense” and “common interest” to describe legal arrangements
involving separate counsel has only exacerbated the uncertainty of whether
privilege attaches in these situations.125

[If] the disclosures were perhaps made in the sole interest of preventing future antitrust violations,
as the defendants argue in their motion for reconsideration, . . . they hardly could be seen as the
commencement of an allied litigation effort.”).
119. Id. at 719 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States,
768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985), United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir.1986), and
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989)).
120. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 357 (“In the Fifth Circuit, the
two types of communications protected under the common interest doctrine are: (1)
communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their counsel, and (2)
communications between potential co-defendants and their counsel. These oft-cited categories of
protected communications are quite narrow when compared to the limits established in other
circuits, and thus district courts in this circuit may arguably be reluctant to extend the common
interest doctrine any further.”); see also Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 719–20.
121. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
122. Id. at 416; cf. supra text supported by note 9.
123. Duplan Corp v. Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) (“This
court recognizes that it is not the federal government that is primarily responsible for enforcement
of the federal antitrust laws but rather the lawyers who advise their corporate clients. Unless
corporate personnel on a fairly low level can speak to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of
the federal antitrust laws is likely to be adversely affected.”).
124. See id.; see also In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is often prior
to the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped either to help clients avoid
litigation or to strengthen available defenses should litigation occur. For instance, lawyers
routinely . . . consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or securities
lawsuits.”); supra text supported by note 9.
125. In re Sulfuric Acid, 235 F.R.D. at 417.
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A New York appellate court recently sorted through some of these
considerations thoughtfully in Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.126 That New York was the venue reflects it being the domiciliary
state of many corporations, as well as its high court’s thoughtful parsing of
common law.127
The factual setting was the archetypal corporate
collaboration: materials shared between companies undertaking a merger and
its attendant legal complexities.128 At issue were hundreds of documents
shared during pre-merger discussions that the trial court had ordered produced,
finding that “that the common-interest rule, an exception to the attorney-client
privilege, does not apply unless the parties share a common legal interest that
impacts potential litigation involving all parties, and that to hold otherwise
would be inconsistent with the narrow scope of the attorney-client
privilege.”129
After reviewing contrary authority, the appellate panel
disagreed:
We find, however, that this line of cases does not adequately address
the specific situation presented here: two business entities, having
signed a merger agreement without contemplating litigation, and
having signed a confidentiality agreement, required the shared advice
of counsel in order to accurately navigate the complex legal and
regulatory process involved in completing the transaction. As BAC
aptly asserts, imposing a litigation requirement in this scenario
discourages parties with a shared legal interest, such as the signed
merger agreement here, from seeking and sharing that advice, and
would inevitably result instead in the onset of regulatory or private
litigation because of the parties’ lack of sound guidance from
counsel. This outcome would make poor legal as well as poor
business policy.130
Accordingly, the court rejected the litigation requirement and instead adopted
the better rule that privilege is not forfeited so long as the parties to the
attorney-client communication share a common legal interest.131
The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed in a fractured 4-2
decision.132 The majority ruled against a backdrop of twenty years during
126. 998 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y.
June 9, 2016).
127. See David E. Bland & Scott G. Johnson, Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Investigations Involving Attorneys: What Is Fair Game in Discovery?, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 32–33 (2d ed. 1997).
128. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 331–32.
129. Id. at 332.
130. Id. at 336–37.
131. Id. at 337.
132. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS
1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016).
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which New York courts had “restricted the common interest doctrine to
pending or anticipated litigation,” declining the invitation to expand the
privilege further in light of modern developments.133 In particular, the
majority fretted that untethering common interest privilege from litigation
would render it unadministrable and prone to abuse,134 and opined that its
litigation requirement had occasioned no “corporate crisis” in merger practice
during those twenty years.135 The dissent, by contrast, adopted much of the
appellate panel’s reasoning, emphasizing that the attorney-client privilege has
no litigation requirement itself, promoting the free flow of information
between client and counsel,136 and that encouraging privilege in the merger
context could only support companies’ compliance with the law.137 It rejected
as speculative any potential for abuse, noting robust protections deriving from
the crime-fraud doctrine and requirement of legal rather than commercial
commonality.138 And it noted that eschewing a litigation requirement would
have brought New York into synchrony with many other state and federal
jurisdictions.139
Indeed, the appellate panel in Ambac had observed that its rule has been
widely adopted in the federal courts, calling it the “federal approach,”140
echoing other courts that have noted that “federal case law makes clear that the
common interest doctrine applies even where there is no litigation in
progress.”141 This is no exaggeration: the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits have all rejected a strict litigation
requirement,142 while only the Fifth has embraced it.143 As mentioned earlier,
133. Id. at *18.
134. Id. at *18–19.
135. Id. at *18.
136. Id. at *25–26 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at *38–40.
138. Id. at *39–40.
139. Id. at *10 & n.1.
140. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 334–35
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016). (“Neither this
Court nor the Court of Appeals has yet considered the propriety of a litigation requirement for the
common-interest privilege. However, the federal courts that have addressed the issue have
overwhelmingly rejected that requirement.”).
141. HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 71 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
142. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F.Supp.2d 52, 60 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting the
Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or unlitigated matter”); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237,
243–44 (2d Cir. 1989) (It is “unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for the
common interest rule of the attorney-client privilege to apply.”); In re Teleglobe Comm’ns Corp,
493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ommunity-of-interest privilege . . . applies in civil and
criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”); United States v. Aramony, 88
F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“But it is unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress
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the Supreme Court itself has proposed a federal rule of common interest
without any such requirement.144 One court of appeals even upheld common
interest between parties to a merger that eventually collapsed, leaving them
adversaries in the ensuing legal action.145 Such jurisprudential concord is vital
to companies contemplating combinations,146 where mutual discussions with
antitrust counsel are often undertaken.147 Imposing a litigation requirement
inefficiently exposes merging companies to potentially protracted discovery
rather than encouraging them to forestall a lawsuit entirely.148 The irony that
Ambac points to is that a litigation requirement for common interest would
increase the risk of those very suits.149
On the other hand, more latitude may be afforded by work product privilege.
Some courts have recognized the assessment of potential antitrust litigation
occasioned by a merger as sufficiently concrete to qualify as being prepared

for this privilege to apply.”); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir.
2007) (“[C]ommunications need not be made in anticipation of litigation to fall within the
common interest doctrine.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922 (8th
Cir. 1997) (quoting the Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or
nonlitigated matter”); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964)
(Common interest applies “irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated.”); In re Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Common interest “is not limited to
actions taken and advice obtained in the shadow of litigation.”).
143. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 714–16 (5th Cir. 2001).
144. See supra note 87. However, Congress declined to codify the privilege and instead
directed federal courts to apply traditional common law. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
145. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
146. See, e.g., In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Securities Litig., No. 06-CV-4674, 2007 WL
2363311, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[A]fter the parties to the merger signed the merger
agreement, they shared a common interest in ensuring that the newly agreed merger met any
regulatory conditions and achieved shareholder approval.”); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
No. CL 81833, 2002 WL 34217931 (Ia. Dist. Ct. April 15, 2002) ( “The Purchaser and Director
Defendants’ common interest began with the execution of the merger agreement. From this point
forward, . . . they had a common interest - legal strategies for seeking regulatory approval and
discussions relating to the joint defense of this lawsuit - in effectuating the merger agreement. . . .
communications prepared in reference to regulatory approval after the merger agreement was
executed are protected.”).
147. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336–37
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016); see also
Kathryn M. Fenton, Conflict and Ethics Issues Arising from Joint Defense/Common Interest
Relationships, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Dec. 2009) (“It is common for companies under
investigation for possible cartel activities to enter into a JDA [joint defense agreement] to
facilitate fact gathering and development of a coordinated strategy. Similar interests might
motivate formation of common interest groups in merger reviews or civil antitrust lawsuits.”).
148. See Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296. But see Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 149 (“Parties cooperating in conjunction with a business transaction, such as a merger or business deal, are not
necessarily pursuing a common or joint defense.”).
149. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
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“because of” litigation, and thus within the work product privilege.150 Their
reasoning is straightforward: to permit discovery of such an assessment would
flout the very concerns central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the work
product privilege in Hickman v. Taylor: “asked by a client to evaluate the
antitrust implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim
had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected would not
likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum assessing the merger’s
weaknesses.”151 Even when competitors are collaborating towards a common
end, claims of common interest in work product may find a more sympathetic
ear because of the work product privilege’s built-in nexus to litigation.152
II. SOME COMMON MISSTEPS ANENT COMMON INTEREST IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
Yet for all its ubiquity elsewhere, the federal approach—that is, rejection of
the litigation requirement in the attorney-client common interest context—has
enjoyed unsettled application in a vital jurisdiction for merging companies, the
D.C. Circuit, where antitrust actions are often filed and precedent is made.153
No circuit has been immune from some degree of confusion about common
interest.154 But the district courts in the D.C. Circuit have generated a notably
disjointed corpus of precedent,155 with some imposing a litigation requirement
and others not. Broadly speaking, the lack of cohesion has two wellsprings.
The first and more fundamental flows from gauzy treatment of the divergent
rationales for common interest in maintaining work product privilege on the
one hand, and the attorney-client privilege on the other.156 The second arises
from conflation of modern common interest doctrine with its conceptual
forebears in the joint defense or even co-client privilege.157 Where these
currents of confusion have intersected, the law of common interest has become
150. See e.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
151. Id. at 886 (proceeding to explain how such a situation would defy Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947): “Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing, note-taking, and
communications so critical to effective legal thinking would, in Hickman’s words, ‘demoraliz[e]’
the legal profession, and ‘the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served.’”).
152. See Schomig, supra note 40, at 12–13.
153. See Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 741, 741 (2006) (“In this brief comment, I will use the debate over the enduring meaning of
Microsoft to argue that the D.C. Circuit has surpassed the United States Supreme Court as the
most important and articulate antitrust court and has outshone the highest court in the land in
crafting honest and true antitrust doctrine consistent with history, precedent, and policy.”).
154. See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45 (discussing common
interest concerns in each circuit).
155. Take, for example, the despondent sentiment expressed in the epigram to this Article by
one of those district courts in Miller v. Holzmann. 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
156. See infra Section II.A.
157. See infra Section II.B.
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a hazardous morass for companies seeking surety for their secrecy.158 Such
confusion is all the more perplexing—and readily resoluble—given the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that point to consistent answers.159
A. Work-Product Versus Attorney-Client Privilege
Some of the entanglement originates from the oft-cited decision of the D.C.
Circuit in United States v. AT&T.160 MCI, a litigant in a separate antitrust suit
against AT&T, had disclosed documents subject to work product privilege to
the United States, and attempted to intervene in the government’s case to
defend its privilege, but the district court denied both intervention and work
product protection.161 The court of appeals then reversed, finding MCI’s
intervention mandatory,162 and upholding MCI’s work product claims despite
the disclosure to the government, citing the common interest doctrine:
We do not endorse a reading of the GAF Corp. standard so broad as
to allow confidential disclosure to any person without waiver of the
work product privilege. The existence of common interests between
transferor and transferee is relevant to deciding whether the
disclosure is consistent with the nature of the work product privilege.
But “common interests” should not be construed as narrowly limited
to co-parties. So long as transferor and transferee anticipate
litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues,
they have strong common interests in sharing the fruit of the trial
preparation efforts.163
By its terms, the AT&T court’s holding on common interest was therefore
cabined to the work product privilege, which presupposes adversarial
litigation.164 Indeed, the court grounded its holding in the starkly contrasting
purposes of attorney-client and work product privileges, observing that the
“purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect information against
opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a particular confidential
relationship, in order to encourage effective trial preparation.”165 Common
interest in the work product context is inherently and unobjectionably tethered

158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312–13 (D.D.C. 2009)
(engaging in both misapprehensions).
159. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 29
F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
160. Am. Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d at 1299–1300.
161. Id. at 1288.
162. Id. at 1295.
163. Id. at 1299.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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to the lawsuit that animates the work product privilege itself.166 Work product
applies only to documents created “because of” litigation.167 To be sure, the
D.C. Circuit has recognized that work product privilege may attach in advance
of the lawsuit being filed, or based on work to avoid legal action on a
particular claim.168 The requisite “eye toward litigation” may be attenuated,
but there must still be a nexus.169 Modern attorney-client privilege, by
contrast, undeniably has no litigation requirement whatsoever.170
The problem arose when lower courts later mistakenly cited to AT&T for
common interest reasoning in the wholly different posture of the attorneyclient privilege, even though the court of appeals had distinguished it
sharply.171 The first such case, Holland v. Island Creek Corp.,172 cited AT&T
alone for the proposition that “[u]nder the common interest rule, individuals
may share information without waiving the attorney-client privilege if: (1) the
disclosure is made due to actual or anticipated litigation . . . .”173 Others courts
in the D.C. Circuit followed apace.174 Some selectively quoted AT&T as to the
litigation requirement whilst trimming away the holding’s limitation to the
work product privilege.175 Inexorably, district courts came to be citing their

166. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The work product privilege
protects any material obtained or prepared by a lawyer ‘in the course of his legal duties, provided
that the work was done with an eye toward litigation.’”) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
864 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
167. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that most
circuits apply the “because of” standard to work product).
168. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
169. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 718 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809).
170. See Welles, supra note 57, at 325–26 (“The attorney-client privilege currently extends
to any communication made in order to facilitate the rendition of legal services to a client,
‘irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated’”) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2294–
95); see also Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991)
(“The prospect of litigation may be relevant to the subject of work product and trial preparation
materials, but the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation.”).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65; see also United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
172. 885 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1995).
173. Id. at 6.
174. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ.99329, 2004 WL 2009413, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004) (“Parties may successfully operate under
the common interest privilege if the communication: 1) is prompted by actual or anticipated
litigation . . . .”).
175. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 303 F.R.D. 419, 427
(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299–1300 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)) (“A common interest privilege can exist ‘so long as [the] transferor and transferee
anticipate litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues.’”); see also Miller v.
Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
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own colleagues’ holdings,176 creating a false impression of consensus about
common interest based on a single mistaken predicate.
Perhaps, this is partly the result of the passage of time since the AT&T
decision; the earliest of these misconstructions was issued in 1995, fifteen
years after the original holding.177 One district court even recognized that
AT&T spoke only to common interest in the work product privilege, but
nonetheless assumed “that the common interest rule is equally applicable” to
attorney-client privilege, whilst noting “it is possible that the precise scope of
the common interest rule will vary as applied to each privilege because of the
differing purposes of the privileges.”178 Another also conceded AT&T’s basis
in work product theory, yet still found the holding supports the requirement of
pending litigation even for the attorney-client privilege.179 The latter court’s
frustration shows through in the opinion, as when it pronounces, with certain
hint of resignation, “Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the
common law, as interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear
explanation of what a common interest is . . . .”180 Such a sentiment is hardly
original, as many courts and commentators have offered similar laments.181
Such pessimism, however, discounts the many trial courts and appellate
panels in the D.C. Circuit that have gotten AT&T right. Only two years later,
the court of appeals followed AT&T faithfully in distinguishing the purposes of
the attorney-client and work product privileges, and quoted its holding on
common interest only for the latter.182 Subsequent court of appeals decisions
followed suit.183 And numerous district court decisions have similarly read
176. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Holland, 885 F. Supp. at 6), vacated, 786 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2011).
177. Holland, 885 F. Supp. at 6.
178. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 313 n.4
(D.D.C. 1994).
179. See Miller, 240 F.R.D. at 22 (quoting United States v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d
1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (“More to the point, in this Circuit, the court of appeals has
indicated that the work product privilege is not lost even if it is shared by entities that are not coparties in litigation so long as ‘transferor and transferee anticipate litigation against a common
adversary on the same issue or issues.’ While the court was speaking of the work-product
privilege, the decision at least points away from any greater requirement than a common interest
in litigation against a common adversary.”).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 551–53; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 51–54.
182. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817–18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“We have held that a
party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to
anyone without ‘common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.’”).
183. E.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As we
explained in AT&T, the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine serve different
purposes: the former protects the attorney-client relationship by safeguarding confidential
communications, whereas the latter promotes the adversary process by insulating an attorney’s
litigation preparation from discovery.”); United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir.
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AT&T as speaking only to the work product privilege’s requirement of
litigation, and clearly differentiated the rationales for assertion and waiver of
attorney-client privilege.184
In fairness, AT&T might be read as questioning whether common interest is
available at all in the attorney-client context, given its emphasis on
confidentiality.185 At least one district court has thought as much.186 But in
1994, the court of appeals explained in In re Sealed Case187 that “common
interest privilege protects communications between a lawyer and two or more
clients regarding a matter of common interest,” without expressing any
reservation about litigation.188 (It is inconvenient but unavoidable, given the
secrecy of the grand jury context in which matters of privilege often arise, that
the appellate court has decided so many cases anent privilege under the caption
In re Sealed Case.189)

2009); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Tr. of Elec. Workers
Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010)
(“AT&T was followed in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, where the claim was made
that the Department of Justice had forfeited its work-product privilege when it disclosed its workproduct in rebutting claims made against it in a Congressional committee report. The court of
appeals rejected the forfeiture, invoking the AT&T case for the principle that the work-product
privilege is forfeited only when the disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining the secrecy of the
work-product from the disclosing party’s adversary.” (citations omitted)).
184. E.g., Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 370 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The attorney-client and
work-product privileges serve different societal interests.”) (quoting Tr. of Elec. Workers, 266
F.R.D. at 13); In re Apollo Grp. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 12, 23 (D.D.C. 2008); Nishnic v. Dep’t of
Justice, 671 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Latin Inv. Corp. v. L & L Constr. Assoc.,
Inc., 160 B.R. 262, 263–64 (Bankr. D.C. 1993).
185. In re United Mine Workers Of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312, 313
n.4 (D.D.C. 1994) (observing without holding that “it is possible to read some language in the
American Tel. and Tel. case (especially in light of In re Sealed Case) to suggest that the common
interest rule is inapplicable to situations where information protected by the attorney-client
privilege is disclosed to a third party because any such disclosure (even to an individual or entity
with a common interest) would be inconsistent with the confidentiality inherent in the attorneyclient relationship.”); see also United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.D.C.
1980) (“We do not consider the strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege context,
as reflected in D’Ippolito, to be appropriate for work product cases. The attorney-client privilege
exists to protect confidential communications, to assure the client that any statements he makes in
seeking legal advice will be kept strictly confidential between him and his attorney; in effect, to
protect the attorney-client relationship. Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege
is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”).
186. E.g., United Mine Workers, 159 F.R.D. at 313 n.4.
187. 29 F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 719. Technically, what Sealed Case described was co-client privilege, but the
court did not distinguish clearly between separate or mutual counsel in the common interest
context.
189. See generally In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case,
29 F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re
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The Holland court’s failure the very next year in 1995 to follow the
guideposts in Sealed Case, and its choice to instead transplant AT&T’s logic
regarding work product, is perplexing.190 Nor did the court of appeals view
AT&T itself as pointing in a different direction; three years after Holland, it
read AT&T and Sealed Case together as establishing that common interest
applied not only to work product but also to attorney-client privilege, and again
omitted any litigation requirement for the latter: “as a usual rule, disclosure of
attorney-client or work product confidences to third parties waives the
protection of the relevant privileges; however, when the third party is a lawyer
whose client shares an overlapping ‘common interest’ with the primary client,
the privileges may remain intact.”191 Several district courts have found
common interest may attach in the attorney-client context.192 Whatever the
source of confusion in other district courts between work product and attorneyclient privilege, the court of appeals has made its own reasoning passably
clear.
B. Joint Defense (and Co-Client) Versus Common Interest Privilege
Just as district courts in the D.C. Circuit have often confused common
interest principles in the work product and attorney-client contexts, they have
also conflated the common interest privilege itself with its predecessor in the
joint defense privilege.193 And once again, such confusion is puzzling because
the court of appeals has spoken directly to the issue.194 In Sealed Case, the
panel clearly recognized and distinguished between discrete joint interest and
common interest privileges, holding that appellant had properly raised each
before the lower court and thereby preserved both claims.195 The court
described joint defense privilege as follows:

Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To avoid confusion, references to Sealed Case
in the main text will be limited to the seminal 1994 decision.
190. See Holland v. Island Creek Corp., 885, F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1995).
191. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
192. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d
66, 74 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The attorney-client common interest privilege ‘protects communications
between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest.’ It applies to
both ‘communications subject to the attorney-client privilege’ and ‘communications protected by
the work-product doctrine.’” (citations omitted)).
193. See, e.g., Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16
(D.D.C. 2007); see also United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 2000).
194. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718–19 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
195. Id. (“The appellant also argues that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his
communications with the Lawyer. Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company
share an attorney-client privilege regarding their consultations with the Lawyer. Therefore, he
argues, any waiver of the privilege that he made was ineffective because a jointly held privilege
can be waived only by all of its holders. In response, the Government claims that the appellant
waived his common interest privilege argument by failing to raise it below. We disagree.
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The joint defense privilege protects communications between two or
more parties and their respective counsel if they are engaged in a
joint defense effort. The party asserting the privilege must show:
“(1) the communications were made in the course of a joint defense
effort; (2) the statements were designed to further the effort; and (3)
the privilege has not been waived.” The district court rejected the
joint defense privilege because there was no “actual or potential
litigation” or strong possibility thereof at the time the appellant
consulted the Lawyer.196
As with work product, the joint defense privilege by its very terms requires an
actual or potential litigation against which to jointly defend.197 Not so with the
distinct common interest privilege, which looks only to sharing a “matter of
common interest.”198 Indeed, AT&T had only a few years before expressly
rejected cramped restrictions even in the work product context, finding that
“‘common interests’ should not be construed as narrowly limited to coparties.”199
Despite this critical difference, district courts in the D.C. Circuit have
regularly conflated the two and thereby imported the joint defense litigation
requirement into the common interest privilege.200 The first such case, United
States v. Hsia,201 enigmatically cites directly to Sealed Case for the proposition
that the “joint defense privilege, often referred to as the common interest rule,
is an extension of the attorney-client privilege that protects from forced
disclosure communications between two or more parties and/or their respective
counsel if they are participating in a joint defense agreement.”202 Such an
equation of the two privileges cannot be found in Sealed Case, yet Hsia’s gloss
has proven influential. It was quoted wholesale in United States v. Phillip
Morris203 and Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.,204 the latter of
which was in turn cited in NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp.205 for the
Although the Government is correct in noting that the appellant concentrated his argument on the
joint defense privilege in district court, he also asserted the common interest privilege.”).
196. Id. at 719 n.5 (citations omitted).
197. See id.; United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002).
198. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; cf. Holland v. Island Creek Corp., 885 F. Supp. 4
(D.D.C. 1995).
199. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Work
product still requires litigation, but as discussed above, the putative parties in joint defense were
litigants in separate but related litigations. Id. at 1288–90.
200. E.g., United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2000); Minebea Co., Ltd. v.
Papst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2005).
201. 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 7 (D.D.C. 2000).
202. Id. at 16 (referencing In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 719 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
203. No. Civ. A. 99-2496(GK), 2004 WL 5355972, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2004).
204. 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2007).
205. 257 F.R.D. 302, 302 (D.D.C. 2009), vacated, 786 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2011).
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observation that the “common interest doctrine is also sometimes referred to as
the joint defense privilege when applied to codefendants.”206 Resting on this
tottering tower of authority, these later courts denied common interest privilege
for lack of a mutual adversary.207
They also relied on another district court case,208 Mineaba Co. v. Pabst,209
which warrants slightly more elaboration. Like the others, Mineaba began by
excerpting Hsia at length.210 But it then highlighted the difficulties resulting
from joint defense and common interest being shoehorned into a single
doctrine, declaring that protected documents “must be disclosed pursuant to a
common legal interest and pursuant to an agreement to pursue a joint
defense.”211
Similarly, Mineaba directly juxtaposes one out-of-circuit
authority that “the party seeking to claim privilege still must demonstrate that
the specific communications at issue were designed to facilitate a common
legal interest; a business or commercial interest will not suffice”212 with
another finding the privilege “arises out of the need for a common defense, as
opposed merely to a common problem.”213 The result is no more handsome
than Dr. Frankenstein’s work;214 demanding that parties simultaneous meet the
requirements for both the joint defense and common interest doctrines does
service to neither.
Finally, courts in the D.C. Circuit215 have occasionally collapsed the
historical and doctrinal gaps between co-client and common interest
privileges.216 In Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of

206. Id. at 312.
207. See Intex, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (“A party which relies on the joint defense privilege or
common interest doctrine must establish that ‘the parties had agreed to pursue a joint defense
strategy.’”); NLRB, 257 F.R.D. at 312 (holding that “the definition of ‘common interest’ is not
entirely settled, but in any event the parties must have a common interest in the prosecution of a
common defendant”).
208. See Intex, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 16; NLRB, 257 F.R.D. at 312.
209. 228 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 2005).
210. Id. at 15–16.
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. (referencing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D.
437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
213. Id. (quoting Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 689 F. Supp. 841, 845
(N.D. Ill. 1988)) (alteration removed).
214. See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS
(LACKINGTON, HUGHES, HARDING, MAVOR & JONES 1818).
215. E.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 66,
74 (D.D.C. 2010); see also United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No.
Civ.99-3292004, 2004 WL 2009413, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004).
216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs
from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”).
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Eng’rs,217 the district court looked to Sealed Case for precedent on attorneyclient common interest privilege.218 It properly made no mention of a litigation
requirement, yet then went on to conclude that “the privilege applies only
where the same attorney represents each of the clients.”219 In fairness, the
“common interest” posture in Sealed Case itself described a single attorney
representing multiple clients—properly, co-client privilege—but the court
hardly limited its reasoning on common interest to that factual posture.220 If
nothing else, Chesapeake Bay vividly illustrates the confusion occasioned by
describing doctrine for common interest and co-client privilege in one
breath.221 Nonetheless, only two years earlier, the court of appeals had more
clearly defined common interest as applying amongst multiple attorneys.222
Prior appellate decisions had found that common interest attached in situations
beyond the co-client context.223 Ambivalent terminology aside, Chesapeake
Bay simply cannot be reconciled with such controlling precedents. (And in
any event, there is no litigation requirement in the co-client context in the D.C.
Circuit.)224
Lest the muddle be thought impenetrable, other D.C. Circuit district courts
have had little trouble distinguishing between joint defense and common
interest. For example, Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.225 treated each of the
two individually, and enumerated the distinct factors required for each.226
Meanwhile, after setting forth distinctions between the attorney-client and

217. 722 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2010).
218. Id. at 74.
219. Id.
220. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The appellant also argues
that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his communications with the Lawyer.
Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company share an attorney-client privilege
regarding their consultations with the Lawyer.”). Indeed, the court made clear separately that the
“joint defense privilege protects communications between two or more parties and their
respective counsel if they are engaged in a joint defense effort.” Id. at 719 n.5.
221. See sources cited supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
222. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
224. See, e.g., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998)
(“This conduct shows that both [co-clients] Jack MacKay and H & B had a common legal interest
in the development of the aluminum bat patent application.”).
225. No. Civ. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009413 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004).
226. Compare id. at *3 (“The joint prosecution privilege protects disclosures between two or
more parties and their respective counsel if their communications are conducted under a joint
prosecution agreement.”), with id. at *4 (“The common interest privilege protects disclosures
between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest or common
interests.”). Then again, Pogue mistakenly imported the litigation requirement from the work
product context, and it arguably shared Chesapeake Bay’s misconception of common interest as
applying only to co-clients, so it is hardly a model of clarity. Id.
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work product privileges, Purcell v. MWI Corp.227 discussed Sealed Case at
length and explained the differing definitions and purposes for the related but
distinct joint defense and common interest privileges.228 In short, as was
manifest in Sealed Case, D.C. Circuit courts “recognize both a joint-defense
privilege and a common-interest privilege.”229 Having completed this
comprehensive tour of evidentiary protections, the Purcell court concluded that
the “overarching principle that governs these privileges remains the same—
protecting attorney-client correspondence on matters of common interest and
‘protecting attorneys’ preparations for trial and encouraging the fullest
preparation without fear of access by adversaries.’”230 But like goals do not
make for identical privileges, and delicate discrimination is necessary to
navigate the jurisprudential jungle of multi-party privilege.
III. COMMON SENSE AND COMMON INTEREST: A WAY FORWARD
The D.C. Circuit has often treated claims of privilege parsimoniously as
compared to other jurisdictions.231 As this author has written elsewhere, some
of its jurisprudence demands disclosure of seemingly privileged material, to
the point that the Department of Justice has advised that such precedents are no
longer good law in light of contrary Supreme Court rulings.232 Its court of
appeals has been particularly severe with regard to waiver of the attorneyclient privilege due to disclosure to a third party: until 2008, “any disclosure
automatically constitute[d] waiver, even in the case of inadvertent
disclosure,”233 and that draconian rule was only displaced by the Supreme
Court’s promulgating Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).234 The court of
appeals has historically demanded absolute secrecy as the “traditional price” of

227. 209 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 2002).
228. See id. at 25.
229. See id.
230. See id. (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
231. See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr’ns, 262 F.R.D. 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2009).
232. See Jared S. Sunshine, The Part & Parcel Principle: Applying the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Email Attachments, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 47, 72–73 & n.100 (2015); compare Mead
Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (non-confidential
facts embodied in privileged communications are subject to discovery), with Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (facts embodied in privileged communications are
protected).
233. See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Just over a year ago, parties in
defendants’ position in this Circuit would have no argument to protect against waiver; they would
simply be dead in the water with an inadvertent disclosure. The District of Columbia Circuit
found that any disclosure automatically constitutes waiver, even in the case of inadvertent
disclosure. [] Rule 502(b), enacted on September 19, 2008, overrides the longstanding strict
construction of waiver in this Circuit.” (citation omitted)).
234. Id.
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the privilege.235 It is therefore not entirely surprising that the D.C. Circuit has
been unhurried in clearly setting out the exact circumstances under which
multiple parties may share in the attorney-client privilege through the
application of common interest.
There can be no doubt, however, that circuit law recognizes the common
interest privilege, however cautiously. True, this has largely been in the
context of the work product rather than the attorney-client privilege,236 but
several opinions have addressed the latter, albeit more en passant than vis-àvis.237 Most of the heavy lifting is already done: the court of appeals
distinguished early and often between common interest in the work product
and attorney-client contexts,238 and between modern common interest and joint
defense standards.239 What is lacking is a definitive statement on the subject
from the court of appeals, repudiating the litigation requirement and
reaffirming the sacrosanctity of privilege even when multiple parties confer on
legal matters, even before any particularized claim by or against others is
contemplated.240
Speaking to the work product context, the court of appeals has already
articulated the right rationale persuasively, writing that
a contrary ruling would undermine lawyer effectiveness at a
particularly critical stage of a legal representation. It is often prior to
the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped
either to help clients avoid litigation or to strengthen available
defenses should litigation occur. For instance, lawyers routinely . . .
consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or
235. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
236. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Rockwell
Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
237. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 29
F.3d 715, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D.
21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002).
238. See Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d at 139–40; United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 387, 394
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In
re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Tr. of Elec.
Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C.
2010); Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 370 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Apollo Grp. Sec. Litig., 251
F.R.D. 12, 23 (D.D.C. 2008); Nishnic v. Dep’t of Justice, 671 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.D.C. 1987);
Latin Investment Corp. v. L & L Construction Assoc., Inc., 160 B.R. 262, 263–64 (Bankr. D.C.
1993).
239. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; see also Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 25; United States
ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009413, at *3–4
(D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004).
240. See supra text supported by notes 236–39 (showing that the breadth of cases on this
topic do not provide a definitive statement on this aspect of privileges).
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securities lawsuits . . . . [A]sked by a client to evaluate the antitrust
implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim
had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected
would not likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum
assessing the merger’s weaknesses, jotting down on a yellow legal
pad possible areas of vulnerability, or sending a note to a partner—
“After reviewing the proposed merger, I think it’s O.K., although I’m
a little worried about . . . . What are your views?” Nor would the
partner respond in writing, “I disagree. This merger is vulnerable
because . . . .” Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing,
note-taking, and communications so critical to effective legal
thinking would, in Hickman’s words, “demoraliz[e]” the legal
profession, and “the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served.”241
Indeed, the court anticipated Ambac’s logic in concluding that “[w]eakening
the ability of lawyers to represent clients at the pre-claim stage of anticipated
litigation would inevitably reduce voluntary compliance with the law, produce
more litigation, and increase the workload of government law-enforcement
agencies.”242
The D.C. Circuit should apply the same reasoning when it comes to common
interest.243
Particularly in the antitrust and merger setting, Ambac’s
commonsensical rebuke to the litigation requirement serves both equity and
economy by facilitating companies’ sidestepping any illegality ab initio.244
Eight circuits have already agreed in principle, whilst the courts of appeals for
four circuits—including the D.C. Circuit—have not yet made a clear
pronouncement.245 Only the Fifth Circuit stands in open rebellion,246 and
given that it has stood by its precedent,247 and that two of the three states over

241. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (second modification
original).
242. Id. at 887; cf. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, 998 N.Y.S.2d
329, 336–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, —- N.E.2d —- (N.Y. 2016).
243. Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The government’s argument
ignores appellants’ legitimate interest in an early assessment of their legal rights. ‘The first step
in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through
the facts with an eye to the legally relevant.’ Maintaining the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications facilitates this process by encouraging the client to supply his attorney with
relevant information.” (citations omitted) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
390–91 (1981)).
244. See Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 336–37.
245. See supra text supported by notes 142–43.
246. See In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001); see also supra text
supported by notes 113–22.
247. See, e.g., Unites States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (following Santa
Fe, 272 F.3d 705).
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which it has geographical jurisdiction have codified litigation requirements,248
it seems likely to remain so. Unlike the other three circuits that apparently
remain undecided,249 the D.C. Circuit has evaluated common interest with
some regularity, and wants only for a decisive formulation.250 Its court of
appeals therefore has a felicitous opportunity to resolve this thorny and
recurring issue once and for all.
The Supreme Court often repeats by rote the conflicting mandates tugging at
privilege law: protecting the attorney client relationship and adversarial
process more broadly, at the cost of a less comprehensive truth-finding
mission.251 Certainly the D.C. Circuit has mouthed that “familiar platitude.”252
Yet the Supreme Court has also sharply criticized whittling away at the
margins of “one of the oldest recognized privileges in the law,” and concluded
that what evidence exists indicates that a robust privilege serves vital ends.253
The D.C. Circuit has at times agreed, writing that “[l]imitations on the
attorney-client privilege have therefore been drawn narrowly, to remove the
privilege only where the privileged relationship is abused.”254 And the
Supreme Court admonished, in an oft-quoted passage from Upjohn, that an
“uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”255
The present confusion in the D.C. Circuit as to the litigation requirement for
the common interest privilege spurns Upjohn’s admonition, and in the absence
of a definitive statement on common interest by the court of appeals (or the
Supreme Court), the disarray is likely to persist.

248. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). Louisiana is the outlier,
providing that a “client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from
disclosing, a confidential communication . . . by the client or his lawyer, or a representative of
either, to a lawyer, or representative of a lawyer, who represents another party concerning a
matter of common interest.” LA. CODE. EVID. art. 506(b)(3).
249. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 358 (discussing the Sixth
Circuit); id. at 363 (discussing the Tenth Circuit); id. at 364 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit).
250. See supra text supported by notes 236–40.
251. E.g., Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974); see also Schaffzin,
supra note 7, at 56–58 (discussing the attorney-client privilege), 58–59 (discussing the joint
defense privilege), 67–68 (discussing the common interest privilege).
252. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The familiar
platitude is that the privilege is narrowly confined because it hinders the courts in the search for
truth.”); e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Each of the recognized privileges protects a substantial individual
interest or a relationship in which society has an interest, at the expense of the public interest in
the search for truth.”).
253. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409–10 n.4 (1998).
254. Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
255. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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In any event, the D.C. Circuit’s joining the emerging consensus against a
litigation requirement will not heal all the woes of common interest doctrine
for merging companies. Ambac addressed the situation in which the
companies had already executed merger and non-disclosure agreements,
lending substance to their claims of commonality.256 Where does that leave
parties contemplating the antitrust implications (or any other legalities) of a
merger prior to signing an agreement? An Illinois court professedly could not
understand how market participants could share a common interest antedating
a signed agreement: “Prior to the merger, these organizations stood on opposite
sides of a business transaction. From a business standpoint and from a legal
standpoint, the merger parties’ interests stood opposed to each other. They had
no common interest, and indeed, their interests were in conflict.”257 This is
probably the more broadly-held view: “of the cases addressing a party’s
disclosure of confidential information during negotiations, almost all have held
that such disclosure waives the privilege.”258 Some, however, have been more
open to finding common interest even whilst deals are still being negotiated,
claiming the weight of case law points to privilege.259 Such reasoning seems
particularly persuasive in the antitrust context, where even prior to an
agreement, both parties have the same legal interest in assessing the
defensibility of the ensuing combination.
And what of intermediate stages, for example, where the parties have signed
non-disclosure but not merger agreements? Courts do look to non-disclosure
agreements as evidence of confidentiality supporting common interest.260 But
the prudent practitioner should at least reduce any understandings between

256. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336–37
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016); accord
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
257. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., No. 06 C 4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); see, e.g., Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190
(D. Del. 2004); Cheeves v. S. Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 131 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 39 F.3d
326 (11th Cir. 1994).
258. Oak Indus. v Zenith Indus., No. 86-C-4302, 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 27,
1988).
259. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 62 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The weight of the
case law suggests that, as a general matter, privileged information disclosed during a merger
between two unaffiliated businesses would fall within the common-interest doctrine.”) (citing,
inter alia, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
and Rayman v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 655 (D. Neb. 1993)). But
see Oak Indus., 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (explaining why the court declined to follow HewlettPackard).
260. See, e.g., Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, No.
98 C 2679, 1999 WL 754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple,
Inc., 890 F. Supp.2d 508, 518 (D. Del. 2012).
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potential merger participants to a written common interest agreement.261 In
any common interest arrangement, and particularly in exploratory merger
discussions, the parties may ultimately fail to come to terms, and litigation may
ensue.262 The parties may be pursuing other interests that are divergent or even
adversarial.263 Counsel for both sides must therefore weigh the advantages of
sharing information against the disadvantages;264 a written agreement can set
forth the parties’ obligations in the event of the common legal interest’s
cessation or the parties’ divergence.265
Common interest presents knotty issues of law, which are made none the
easier by ostensible doctrinal disarray. But the confusion is not as intractable
as some commentators would have it. One complained that courts are widely
split as to whether a written agreement is necessary, whether there is a
litigation requirement, and whether the common interest need be identical.266
But in fact there is general consensus that an oral agreement may suffice for
the privilege just as it would for any other contract,267 and that a litigation
requirement is counterproductive, at least in federal courts.268 In fairness, there
is much variation as to the necessary degree of similarity of interests.269 All in
all, however, much of the confusion with common interest is more semantic
261. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 44 (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman Asset Mgt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–
83; Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151–52. Common interest
does not require a writing, but memorializing any agreement is undoubtedly prudent both to avoid
misunderstandings and provide evidence to any court. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–82;
Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; e.g., HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259
F.R.D. 64, 72–73 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]hile Nordbank and the non-party lenders wisely
chose to reduce their common agreement to writing, their decision to do so does not mean that
there was no prior agreement. To the contrary, Nordbank has made a persuasive showing that the
parties shared a common interest . . .”); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985); see also Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 309–10.
263. See generally United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979); Eureka
Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F. Supp.
108, 111–12 (D. Conn. 1997); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493 (Bankr. Del. 2010); 330
Acquisition Co. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B, 783 N.Y.S.2d. 805, 805–06 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004); GUS Consulting GMBH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2008).
264. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 354, 365–66; Rosenthal, supra
note 42, at 150–51; e.g., Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D.R.I. 1996).
265. Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at
365–66.
266. See Giesel, supra note 23.
267. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 246 n.10; supra note 261.
268. See supra Section I.B.
269. See, e.g., supra text supported by note 84.
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than substantive, and resoluble largely by more careful selection of language in
arguments and opinions.270 Common interest serves a vital role in increasingly
entangled legal representations, and a clarified understanding of its posture visà-vis joint defense and co-client privilege is essential to fully realizing its
value.

270. See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (criticizing
the “undifferentiated use” of “joint defense” and “common interest”); Giesel, supra note 23, at
478 n.5 (“cataloguing the mishmash of terms”); George S. Mahaffey Jr., Taking Aim at the
Hydra: Why the “Allied-Party Doctrine” Should Not Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the
Government Declines to Intervene, 23 REV. LITIG. 629, 631–33 (2004).
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